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POPULATION POLICY

1. If being aware of the population problem means the realization of the seriousness of the population pressure against China's economic resources, especially at the present technological level, then, it seems that the CCP leaders responsible for planning leading policies have such awareness, but this problem does not claim their attention.
2. This, however, does not mean that they do not know of such a thing as a population problem for China. Since the 1930's, there has been much agitation in Chinese literature on this point, and even a limited movement for birth control has taken place. Most colleges that offer courses on population stress the importance of this point, i.e., excessive population pressure against the nation's resources. Few who have received a modern education fail to get some impression about this point, and the CCP leaders are no exception.
3. There is evidence that this problem has been discussed by them to some extent. One representative in the New People's Political Council held in Peking preceding the formal establishment of the Communist government, made a statement to the effect that "we" (ambiguous as to what this "we" stands for) "recognize that the Malthusian principle of population still operates in rural China to some extent so long as China remains predominantly an agricultural nation." The absence of documentary sources at hand makes it impossible to quote the statement and name of the person who said it. At any rate, the statement shows that the population problem has been in the discussion among the CCP leaders who plan China's future course.
4. The question is, how much of foregoing statement stands for the general opinion of the policy planners. Most probably this is the opinion of only a few. The population problem, as such, perhaps does not concern the serious attention of the majority. In fact, the majority of the high rank cadres and practically all the middle and low rankers regard it as reactionary to mention population as one of China's serious problems. Marx wrote against Malthus in his time, claiming that what caused suffering, hardship and poverty is not population pressure, but

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class exploitation. Other doctrinaires after Marx wrote along the same line. Moscow now takes the same view of any Malthusian conception of the population problem. The CCP fellows, especially the younger set, are deeply ingrained in the same idea. CHANG Chung-lin, head of the higher education division of the Ministry of Education and graduate of the once famous Southeastern University in Nanking, is one example. We argued heatedly over how China's standard of living can be substantially raised without devoting some attention to the problem of population pressure. He insisted that man's productivity under the socialistic system can increase much faster than population, and that there is no such thing as overpopulation, for population are productive elements that can feed themselves, given the right social institutions. Then he was driven to admit some facts of overpopulation in localities specifically quoted, then he mentioned migration to places like Manchuria as an answer. TU Kuo-hsiang, head of the education department of Kwangtung Provincial Government and one of the top few holding influences along with YEH Chien-ying, expressed much the same view. He said to the effect that so long as there is gross injustice and waste and serious obstruction against maximum production by the present social system of class exploitation, let us first correct these and set up a fair and efficient social system, and if after that is done and there is still a genuine problem of population pressure against resources, then we will make attempts to solve it. [redacted] a Soviet Union representative in the UN, working on a committee that had something to do with population, expressed an opinion along this same general idea, and it is evident that the CCP leaders are following the Moscow line in this respect very closely.

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5. It is clear that they are not doing anything with this problem. There is nothing such as a population policy or program. But, unconsciously, many things they do will have some effect on population policy or the population itself.
 6. Population registration records, for one thing, are a great deal more accurate than before. It is a necessary measure for strict police control to have correct records of the inhabitants of a community. Wide margins of error in population registration records caused by omission or duplication of records on the same person, are largely ironed out in big cities and in the parts of the countryside where the land reform program is completed. But this is generally limited to the treatment of the adult population. The record on infants and children and their births and deaths remains doubtful in accuracy. This defect imposes a serious limitation on the demographical value of the population data of the present government. The present shortage of men with competent knowledge of population and vital statistics is one of the factors in causing this defect. Nevertheless, the improved records in adult population will give the government much data to view the population problem in better light than before, when it wants to. For example, in Peking, where the publication of public records seems freer than other places, many more details are known about the population of the city than before. If one day the present government wants to collect data for a population program, it will have the organization and some experience to do it, if not the properly trained personnel, which I doubt even the Soviet Union can supply.
 7. One thing that is bound to affect the population growth substantially is the public health work conducted by the government with much more efficiency than before. Cities are fairly clean, and as one of the party leaders put it, there are a lot of unemployed hands, so why not put them to work in cleaning up the places. Garbage dumps in Peking, for instance, have been removed from the streets for the first time since the end of the anti-Japanese war. Other cities also see improved cleanliness in public places as well as other measures, such as fixing the long neglected sewage system. But most important of all is the beginning of public control of some of the most common epidemics like small pox and typhoid. Serious examination of identifications of small pox vaccination, typhoid injection and the like are conscientiously carried out at major stations of all important transportation lines, and vaccinations or injections are administered by nurses to persons found without evidence of already having had them done. Public health movements are pushed vigorously in large cities and limited areas in the countryside. At the present, for example, a movement is started in Kwangtung Province to give 9,000,000 vaccinations of small pox within two months, and chances are that this goal or something near it will be attained. Now, vaccines are available for 6,000,000 treatments. For a province of some 35,000,000 population, this is a substantial coverage.

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considering the backwardness of the country in public health work. Plague injection is also being carried out in the southern part of the province at present; some 200,000 persons have received this treatment. In the present spring anti-epidemic movement, there is the report of the distribution in the province of 250,000 tubes of mixed typhoid and influenza serum and 740,000 tubes of typhoid serum (South China Daily, March 5, 1951). Such a report is probably authentic as it is non-political. For the fast supply of health personnel, medical colleges are required to offer a five-year course instead of the usual six to seven year course, much against the protest of the medical professors. Then there are training centers in various parts of the country producing short-course graduates in health work. In Kwangtung Province, for instance, the Health Department of the provincial government last year turned out some 1,200 trainees in epidemic prevention corps, public health nurses, and obstetricians. For 1951 it is planned to turn out about 1,700-1,900 personnel of these types and 600 short-course general physicians for the rural districts. Hospitals, medical schools and other medical institutions are pressed into offering free service in giving this training in addition to their regular load of work. Though hastily trained and far short of standards, these personnel will prove a help in view of China's dire needs for such services. The inevitable result will be a reduction of death rates and the acceleration of population growth. The inclusion of obstetric personnel in the large-scale training of health cadres may be interpreted as a conscious effort in boosting the population but if this is the case, it has never been officially indicated.

8. If health measures, one of the most uncontroversially successful undertakings of the Communist government, tend to accelerate population growth in China, there are also negative influences at work that tend to reduce it. One such negative influence is the difficulty of getting married for men who work in the government and in various professional institutions for a salary. Pay is too low to support a family. Political and military workers remain unmarried long after the marriageable age, frequently so during ten or twenty years of service to the party. Pay is evidently figured out for the support of a single individual, not a family. When the CCP was only a local power, this affected only a comparatively small part of the population. But with the whole nation under its management, the need for military and political workers vastly expanded, and huge numbers of people are being recruited with the same poor remuneration. Moreover, the low pay of the party cadres as well as military and political workers is fast becoming the standard for other types of salaried positions, perhaps with the only exceptions of technical men (engineers), doctors and college teachers. This situation either makes marriage impossible or delays it long after the customary age of 20-30 for men and 18-25 for women, for the present. This delay is serious for the change in birth rates, for as it is well known, women married at 24 or 25 have much lower fertility than those married before this age. Though there are no statistics to show the exact extent of the delay of marriage or the present marriage rate among workers under the Communist power, the low marriage rate and the late age of marriage is a general fact. In one gigantic meeting honoring combat heroes in Canton last October, the military leader praised all workers, military and otherwise, for their big sacrifices, which included the foregoing of married life for these who had come into the revolutionary movement for over ten years. "A revolutionist should not have the burden of a family" to bother him and to distract him from work is the general idea. As to those who manage to get married, such as most of the high ranking cadre, this is usually done by both the husband and the wife working, a situation strongly discouraging to having children, or having more than one or two children, as nursery facilities are extremely limited.
9. Such is the case with party cadres, political and military workers, and an increasing number of salaried people. How many people are affected this way is hard to estimate, but one would venture to say that the majority of the middle class, especially the modern educated, altogether to the tune of some 30,000,000 people, fall into this category. (Breaking down this figure: 9,000,000 KMT officials taken over by the new government, some 10,000,000 CCP members and political workers, 5,000,000 military personnel of various description, and at least 6,000,000 others working in salaried positions such as schools under the college level which are geared to government pay standards.)

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10. This figure includes only the salaried workers in certain institutions, and consequently represents an underestimation of the total number of people affected in China. Other middle class elements, such as those in private business and small and middle landlords, all sink to a low economic level, and consequently the marriage of their children is either impossible now, or indefinitely postponed. But their number is hard to estimate. Anyhow, the general fall of marriage and birth rates may be expected.
11. As to the poorer class in the cities, their economic situation either changes little, as in the case of store employees and industrial workers, or changes for the worse, such as city peddlers and coolies and pedicab drivers, as shown in one piece of research we carried out. Marriage and family life has always been a difficult thing for them in the past, and the difficulty increases now. It is a regret that there has been no statistical analysis of differential rates of marriage and birth according to economic class in the past as a basis of estimate for the present. However, for want of adequate data, one may assume that there is very little change for this urban class since the liberation in general.
12. In the rural area, the middle peasants may be expected to have little change in their marriage and birth rates due to the relatively small change in their economic status. But poor and tenant peasants who constitute perhaps 50-60% of the agricultural population as an average for the nation (this is only a general guess with no data on hand for a more careful estimate.) The land reform program here may prove a booster for the growth of this section of the rural population which is numerically dominant when compared with other individual sections of the population.
13. There is one baffling theoretical point here that makes it hard to estimate the possible changes of population growth wrought by the Communist revolution. Demography of the Western countries shows a greater number of children among the poorer section of the population than the middle and upper classes. But in China the reverse, or some degree to the reverse, could be the case. There is no existing reliable data on this point, but a couple of sample studies we conducted seem to lend support to this point. It is not that the poorer class has lower fertility, but their poverty imposes a very high death rate among their children whereas the middle and upper class elements maintain a high birth rate through the traditional concubinage system and their belief in leaving offspring as a filial obligation, and their better economic status results in a lower death rate for their children through better nutrition and medical care. If this should be the case, then, in the past the middle and upper classes were important contributors to the nation's population growth, though the extent remains to be determined, and the present effect of lowering their marriage and birth rates while raising those of the poorer class in the countryside will change the picture radically, especially when the poorer section of the population is numerically strong. Should this almost pure guesswork prove to be the case, the overall picture points to a greater population growth rate in the days to come. But, even if this bears some conformity to facts, there will be a certain time lag such as five to six years under stable conditions before the new effect will emerge.
14. Another presently prominent factor that has a negative effect on population growth is war. The civil war between the CCP and the KMT has, of course, exacted a high toll of lives among both the soldiers and civilians that will leave a deep scar in the birth rate of the population at the present and in the near future. For example, one source in Peking confided that in some districts in Hopei province in North China like Ting Chow, where some of the most savage struggles took place, the sex ratio becomes as discrepant as eleven females to one male in an average of all age groups because of the conscription or recruiting of men for war, leaving only old men and very young males. This is regarded as confidential because such districts obviously constitute soft spots in the Communist area due to their military weakness and the general resentment of the population against the government. How extensive such areas are remains unclear but there is doubt that the draining of males of reproductive age into the armed services is a serious one in the so-called "old liberated areas", due to the protracted struggle those areas faced, and the heavy casualties among the Communist troops during the civil war made some of the draining a permanent loss. After the civil war, the continuation of local military operation and the participation of the Communist Army in the Korean War keep reproductive males from getting married or from staying with their families. The unfavorable influence upon the birth rate of the population by this situation is obvious.

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15. To sum up, the health program will have immediate effect upon reducing the death rate of the population, and the land reform may boost the birth rate of a sizeable proportion of the rural population after a period of economic and social stability. These are positive influences. On the negative side, there is sub-standard income for government and salaried workers that keep people from getting married or having children, and the destruction of the economic position of the middle and upper classes that discourage their birth rate. The continuous military activities have the same effect. The destruction of the family pattern, which includes the traditional belief in begetting numerous children as a filial duty, will have the same negative influence, but the effect will come slowly. When the destruction of the family pattern becomes a general fact, which will take at least five to ten years with the smooth operation of the present system, whether the rate of population growth will be affected depends largely on how the industrialization program works out and what form of balance between birth and death rates will take place. If China by then still remains predominantly agricultural, her population is liable to grow fast, with or without the destruction of the traditional family system, in view of past experience of the Western countries. On the other hand, short of a vigorous movement of birth control, the success of the industrialization program will also boost the growth of the population for a certain period. Such have been the demographic trends of countries with statistical records, with or without the Chinese pattern of family, and one hardly sees any new or particular factor that might make China an exception.
16. The negative influences, those named above, and others too well expected by students of population to need mentioning, will spread, and consequently, the growth of population will be checked or stopped, if internationally there is a war, and domestically the Communist government fails to achieve stability politically, economically, and socially. On the other hand, if internationally there is peace, and domestically the government is able to maintain stability over most of China and the present social and economic programs proceed smoothly for five or ten years, the negative influences will be gradually ironed out by the relative improvement of general social and economic conditions, population growth is liable to accelerate. The amount of acceleration will be hard to predict. One can view the population growth of the Soviet Union since the revolution as a pattern. For Asiatic countries, one can point out that India, the one Asiatic country that has kept relatively reliable demographical records for over a century, say a gain of perhaps 100,000,000 inside of four decades, 1900-1940. Some students maintained that China saw the same gain during the same period. Following this trend, China's future gain, given the favorable conditions, will be rather alarming.
17. As stated at the beginning, the top leaders of the CCP probably are not aware of the weightiness of the problem, but some well educated low ranking party cadres may have some idea of it. For example, in Chekiang province, one college graduate party member related his experience in the land reform of a village. He said that even after dividing up the land, it is impossible to work out a decent standard of living for all of the people belonging to the village. He saw that the change for modern farming methods may bring some improvement, but still not enough. He saw the serious need for birth control and migration. But this person's view is a rare one, and it is not the general conception of most of the party leaders.
18. With no data on hand, one can only point out the general areas where new influences may operate to change the population picture, with or without the awareness of China's present rulers. Furthermore, material on the subject is difficult to obtain, because population and its trends are related to nations' military strength at the present and in the future.

TRANSPORTATION

19. Railways are being efficiently operated, and passenger trains are clean and orderly and fairly punctual. During last summer and fall, old rail ties were being replaced by new ones. But the new ties are made of an inferior pine from Manchuria, and they are not baked for sterilization of worms and insects in the wood, as done before the anti-Japanese war. Moreover, no more S-shape steel holders are nailed onto the two ends as used to be for the prevention of cracking. Consequently, as one railway executive said, these new ties can be expected to last only about eight months, and the road beds are not at all durable. To help prolong the life of the ties and maintain the road beds, railway men's wives and children are pressed into rendering free service a certain number of hours each week to sift dust and dirt from roadbed gravel. This calls forth quite a bit of complaint.

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20. One engineering professor in Peking estimated that the vast majority of the civilian motor vehicles (mostly buses and trucks and very few passenger cars) will break down in about two years because of their conversion into wood, coal or charcoal burning system on account of gas shortage, and the acid content of the producers gas eats into the valves and other parts of the engine. By that time, motor transportation will be a very difficult problem, for there will be no replacements for these engines. For a country as vast as China with so few railways, the destruction of the motor transportation system will produce serious effect in many ways. A similar situation arose during the anti-Japanese war, and the experience at that time perhaps could serve as a reference for the future.
21. What will happen under the steady deterioration of the motor transportation, induced mainly by the shortage of gasoline and replacement parts? Travel will be difficult and the circulation of commodities will be slow, but it is doubtful whether the economy will sink to the breaking point. In fact, chances are that transportation will be to some degree more effective than that in Southwest China under the Chungking government during the War. This is due to the better utilization of the native means of transportation on water and on land. This is shown in the following report from Shanghai, mainly from the Communist New China News Agency, with some supplement from other sources.
22. In the East China region, it is estimated that 40% of all the sailing wooden junks worked in organized teams under the direction of the East China Regional Government during the past year, and half of these organized junks belonged to the northern part of Kiangsu province, where the organization work of the Communist power is most developed due to its long foothold there since the early days of the anti-Japanese war. In that part of the province, two joint operation associations have 216 wooden junks as members, and 78 other wooden boat associations have 5,829 member boats. In that area last year, commodities transported by the organized boats exceeded 100% of those transported by steamships, and equalled to about 80% of all the goods transported overland due to the importance of water transportation in that area. The variety and tonnage of goods transported by the boats are not mentioned in this report, but some incomplete data give some idea of the picture. Commodities shipped out of the rural districts of this area as a whole include such agricultural produce as hog bristles, soya bean, peanuts, eggs and egg products and poultry. It is claimed that, perhaps with some reliability, in the counties of Jukao and T'aihsing, hog production last year was upped 20% compared to the year before last, due to the better transportation facilities provided by the organized utilization of native junks. Into the same area went such daily necessities as papers, cloth and 130,000 tons of food which helped the feeding of the vast number of conscripted laborers employed in the water control work of the Su River in this area.
23. The Shantung provincial branch of the East China Joint Shipping Company, a government outfit, in last December organized 5,000 horse and oxen carts and wheelbarrows for the mass transportation of wheat and other things to East China organ centers such as Shanghai and Wushi, the quantity (not specified) was five times that transported by that company by motor vehicles. During the last quarter of last year, the Shantung Provincial Shipping Company (another government outfit) together with cooperative societies organized large numbers of carts and wheelbarrows and shipped 11,000,000 catties of peanuts from the areas of Laiyang and Wenteng, and 220,000 catties of yellow pears from T'enghsien, which has always been isolated from the outside due to the mountainous terrain. The shipping out of large quantities of fruits from the rural areas is perhaps a fact, for during the summer and fall the coastal cities from Shanghai through Tsinan to Peking, consumers enjoyed a larger variety and quantity of fruits than before. In Peking, puffed tangerines from Szechuen, red tangerines from mid-Yangtze valley, bananas and sugar cane from Kwangtung, pomelos from Kwangsi, besides grapes and apples and pears from the North China plain itself, were seen in plentiful quantities on fruit stands and stores. In Shanghai, fruits from Manchuria (mainly apples) and South China stock the market. This is more than the result of railway transportation, for the fruits are produced in the countryside, frequently very distant from rail lines. In my tours in various parts of the country, including North China, before the anti-Japanese war, the writer has seen fruit selling ruinously cheap and even rotting in the countryside due to the lack of transportation and organized effort to ship them out to urban centers. Facilities of motor transportation is extremely limited and too costly for the transportation of such cheap perishables as fruit. So the story of organized utilization of backward means of transportation must bear some reliability.

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24. Most of the tea leaves from Anhwei, an important tea-producing district in China, were shipped out the same way. In the period from last June to last October, the Northern Anhwei Branch of the East China Shipping Company shipped out 6,000,000 catties of tea leaves from the counties of Liu-an, Hoshan and their adjacent areas, in exchange for food and other necessities which were shipped in the same way. Boats were utilized in organized ways in the same area. Organized utilization of native means of transportation has become the main tool to implement their policy of exchange goods between the cities and the country. If this were the case, the possible forthcoming collapse of motor transportation may not too seriously cripple the economy.
25. During the famine crisis in north and central China last year, it was related by government executives that mass utilization of organized native means of transportation was responsible for the shipment of large quantities of food into the stricken areas. The government did this regardless of cost in some cases. This, together with the concentration of vast quantities of food in the hands of the government, made it possible to avert extensive loss of lives in the famine stricken areas last year.
26. The mode of utilization of native means of transportation, of which there is no shortage, is a noticeable matter, for it concerns the correct estimate of the state of economy in Red China in peace and in war, and the organizational aspect of it may mark the difference between the economy under the KMT and that under the Red regime now and in the future.
27. The above data, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the organized utilization of the native means of transportation has brought about a smooth working of the rural and urban economies in China today. While organized utilization increased the shipping capacity of the native means of transportation as a whole, there are indications that a sizeable proportion of some commercial crops (except cotton) in many parts of the country has not been shipped out to the market due to the destruction of the free market system in many respects and to the ignorance of the party cadres on economic and commercial matters, resulting in gross mismanagement of economic administration. The following cases will explain some angles of this point.
28. Recent conversation with a prominent Tientsin merchant reveals the difficulty in private trading in peanuts, a major commercial crop in the North China plain. He had secured a government permit to export 2,000 tons of peanuts to England. The government required payment to be in U.S. dollars. With great difficulty he succeeded in achieving this term with the English importer. Then the government stopped the loading of the cargo in Tientsin, suddenly changing the required payment from U.S. dollars to pound sterling. With some complaints and arguments among all quarters concerned, the merchant and the importer in London complied with the order. But the government again switched its requirement into pound T.T. This the importer refused absolutely to pay in advance, and the shipment was stopped. The merchant later discovered that the government wanted to sell 5,000 tons of peanuts after granting the permit to him, and the repeated switching of forms of payments was designed to block the transaction for fear that it would reduce the chance of the government selling its own stock. But meanwhile, the merchant said, north China had a bumper crop in peanuts last year, and perhaps as much as 95% of the harvested peanuts are still in the hands of the peasants now. As government marketing organization is still extremely limited in capacity in handling the vast quantities of native products in China, peanuts in this case, it is very important for the government to guide the private commercial firms in quickly shipping out this vast quantity of peanuts to the most advantageous markets. But instead, for the selling of only 5,000 tons, negligible compared to the estimated total harvest of peanuts in North China of about 250,000 tons, the Government made it impossible for private firms to operate.
29. A very similar thing occurred in the trading of walnut meats last December, and this is another commercial crop produced in fairly large quantity in North China. Consequently, only a very limited proportion of the total crop was shipped out last year right after the meat was harvested, a time when the U.S. importers were willing to pay an attractive price for it. Now, stuck with the goods, the government shipped 200 cases down to Hong Kong at a very low price, each case is one picul (133 pounds). Even at a low price people refused to touch it because it had gone rancid, as walnut meat is usually marketed before the middle of January in the warm South China climate.

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Had the government been more intelligent in letting the merchants who know this field handle the business at the proper time, the commercial value of the crop would have been saved. But now it is said that much of the walnut crop still remains up in the trees unharvested for the producers could find no market for it in the international field due to government mismanagement, and the domestic market has not been geared to consume it.

30. These two cases distinctly show the lack of coordination between the organization of transportation and the management of marketing. Now, instead of correcting its own mistakes, the government advises peasants to plant less peanuts and more staples like wheat and kaoliang the next season. But for walnuts the government has offered no solution as yet.

RUSSIAN ADVISERS

31. It is reported by an eye witness that the customs service in Tientsin is completely controlled by two Russian advisers. The said person had imported some machinery from England into Tientsin. The customs service people raised a lot of trouble, and finally, this person was told to see the Russian advisers. Whereupon he saw two Russian advisers who checked the identification numbers on the invoice against those on the machines, found the two sets of numbers agreed with each other, signed the import permit, and the whole case was settled. This person came out amazed, saying that "these two guys are no advisers, they are executives, and what they are doing can be done by any Chinese with a high school education."
32. Russians in Peking are likewise drawing bad criticism. In the People's University in Peking, for example, Russian professors are drawing a salary of US\$10,000 a year each, an eye-opener for any Chinese professor, and the salary is paid out of the Chinese treasury. Moreover, when a Russian professor enters a sitting room where a group of Chinese professors are sitting, the latter have to stand up to pay respect every time. In lectures, the Russian professors are parroting the Marxist-Leninist line with very little illumination on academic questions. Worse still is the fact that, when a Chinese attending the lecture happens to ask a question some original ideas, the questioner will be branded with all kinds of names such as capitalistic thinker, which irritated one prominent Chinese economist who happened to have addressed a question in one of the lectures. The government propaganda put up these Russian professors as great sources of learning, and, as one well known Chinese writer remarks, "Like a pie crust, it is made to be punctured", a remark that probably represents the general evaluation of the Russian professors and lecturers by the Chinese intellectuals. Besides those in Peking, many so-called Russian professors and scholars have toured the country, lecturing to academic institutions and civic groups. The Communist government has spent a lot of money to tour these fellows around the country lecturing and advising, aside from paying them large salaries in U.S. dollars, and it may be said that from Canton to Peking and along the coast, one has heard no good comments regarding them, their contents of their lectures or their personality. In some cases, they are imposing and offensive. There is one Russian woman adviser in nursery education in Peking who publicly, in front of all the teachers of a famous nursery school, scolded the principal for wrong choice of teaching material, saying that the latter should shoulder the sole responsibility of the failure of the school. The material in question was the Black Sambo story which was criticized to be impressing the children with racial prejudice and cowardice. Consequently, the phrase "red imperialism" is being murmured around in many private circles.
33. The number of Russians in Manchuria must be very large, for one railway worker said that Russian cigarettes are sold on most cigarette stands on the sidewalks but only Russians buy them, for the flavor is very disagreeable to Chinese smokers. If Russian cigarettes are so ubiquitous, the customers must be numerous.
34. Incidentally, north of the Yangtze Valley, the Russians are addressed as Lao Ta Ko (big brother) in people's private conversations, a term carrying a derisive tune.
35. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which lists non-party people like LO Lung-chi and FFI Hsiao-tung as its national sponsors, continues to be the main center of high pressuring non-party people into pro-Soviet activities. Also playing an important part is the People's Foreign Relations Association which may be regarded as the

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counterpart of the Foreign Policy Association in name, but in fact it is a semi-official organ of the government on foreign relations, and one of its major functions is to line up the nation's forces for pro-Soviet activities. For instance, among the Chinese students returned from the U.S. and other western lands last summer, all those majoring in international law and its associated fields were put to work in the People's Foreign Relations Association. When asked why, the answer was that this is to diseducate them of their Anglo-American slant of their legal knowledge and instill in them the pro-Soviet conception.

PEOPLE'S MILITIA

36. The government is vigorously pushing the organization of so-called people's militia in various parts of the country, but its progress in Kwangtung Province is very slow. The total number of people's militia in the country was said to be around 1,500,000 but the number in Kwangtung has not been announced; it is probably very small. The reason is obviously the slow progress in the organization of the peasants under the Communist leadership, as the land reform program is being put into effect only in very limited areas in this province, and the peasants are not being trusted with arms in any sizeable number.
37. The old militia was an important element in the maintenance of rural peace and order, and it was under the domination of landlords and the gentry, and in many cases, also the local bullies. These militia were disarmed immediately after the Communists got into the province. The Communists picked younger and poorer elements from the peasants, organized them to take leadership of village affairs, and gave them arms. The new armed elements are called the people's militia. This people's militia is placed under the direct command of the communist armed forces in each locality. The functions of the new militia go beyond the protection of the village against bandits and hostile clans to include the upholding of the new regime by giving armed support to the claims of the poor peasants in accordance with the laws in land reform. They are also required to fight against hostile guerrillas in the countryside in coordination with the regular troops. It remains to be seen whether the organization of the new militia will gain further progress in Kwangtung when the land reform program will be in full swing the next year. Those familiar with the importance of the role played by the militia in traditional Chinese society will appreciate the broad significance of this development. This is especially important when a sizeable proportion of the regular troops are used in prosecuting an international war, and the local matters, including the suppression of local rebellions, is partly left to the local military organizations of the population such as the militia. Just now, besides a few in number, the new militia in Kwangtung are poor in quality, some of them closely associated with influences hostile to the Communist regime such as those in the delta land of the Pearl River, as admitted by the government people quite publicly, as some of these statements appeared in the local papers sponsored by the government.